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The Impact of Institutional Differences on Derivatives Usage: 
A Comparative Study of US and Dutch Firms 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the influence of institutional differences on risk management practices in the US and 
the Netherlands.  This comparison is interesting because the Dutch firms’ institutional setting differs from 
the US setting with respect to shareholder orientation, international trade, disclosure regulation, and  
reliance on financial markets.  In contrast with previous comparisons, we apply a matching and weighting 
strategy that corrects for differences over industry and size classes across the Dutch and US samples.  
After these corrections, the remaining results can be attributed more directly to institutional differences.   
We find that due to the greater openness of the Netherlands, Dutch firms hedge more financial 
risk, especially more currency risk, than US firms.  Dutch firms, however, show a lower level of concern 
over derivatives usage, which is consistent with having less active minority shareholders and less strict 
disclosure requirements than the US has.  Dutch firms focus le ss on stabilizing accounting earnings with 
derivatives than US firms, which is likely attributable to the strong shareholder orientation in the US 
versus the stakeholder orientation in the Netherlands.  Whereas Dutch firms tend to rely almost 
exclusively on OTC-transactions, US firms use exchange-traded derivatives and more counter-parties.  
This results in US firms imposing stricter requirements on counter-party rating for derivatives 
transactions.  This distinction can be attributed to the differences in the financial environments between 
the US and the Netherlands.  These, and other results, strongly suggest that institutional differences 
between the US and the Netherlands have an important impact on risk management practices and 
derivatives use across US and Dutch firms. 
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I.  Introduction 
The use of derivative securities for risk management purposes has been a worldwide phenomenon for 
several decades.  The growing use of these instruments is part of an increased awareness of risk 
management among corporate managers.  Active risk management is now an important part of modern 
corporate financial culture.  As a result of this phenomenon, the market for derivative instruments has 
expanded rapidly over the last 10 to 15 years.   Despite the growth of these markets, relatively little is 
known about how firms actually use derivatives for risk management purposes.  Several survey studies 
have investigated derivatives usage for risk management purposes in the United States (US).  The often-
cited Wharton Surveys (Bodnar, Hayt, Marston and Smithson (1995) and Bodnar, Hayt and Marston 
(1996, 1998)) provide detailed descriptions of derivatives usage among US non-financial firms.  
A number of similar studies have examined derivatives usage in several countries.  Recent studies 
include: New Zealand (Berkman, Bradbury and Magan, 1997), Sweden (Alkebäck and Hagelin, 1999), 
Germany (Gebhardt and Russ, 1999), Belgium (De Ceuster, Durinck, Laveren and Lodewyckx, 2000), 
UK (Mallin, Ow-Yong and Reynolds, 2001) and Switzerland (Loderer and Pichler, 2000).  One purpose 
of this paper is to add to the countries in this list by investigating derivatives use among firms in the 
Netherlands.  While understanding the nature of derivatives usage in various countries is an important 
issue, a more interesting economic question is  whether carefully measured differences in behavior across 
countries can be reasonably related to differences in the environment.  The second, and more important 
purpose of this paper is to compare the Dutch results with the established evidence from firms in the US 
in such a way that differences in derivatives usage can be attributed to the differences in the institutional 
and informational environments.  While the aforementioned studies provide information about risk 
management practices in countries other than the US, most do not facilitate a direct comparison between 
US and non-US firms. Not only are the questions asked generally not directly comparable, but the 
samples studied are different with respect to their distributions over size and industry classes 
(characteristics that theory suggests should influence derivatives usage).  Thus, simple comparisons 
across these studies do not allow clear conclusions to be drawn because differences may be attributed to 
either the institutional setting or differences in distributions across size and industries between countries.  
One exception to this problem is Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) who use simple matched-industry samples 
in order to compare the risk management practices of US and German firms.  In contrast with the Bodnar 
and Gebhardt paper, we facilitate a more direct comparison by applying a weighting strategy that corrects 
for differences in distributions over size and industry classes between the Dutch and US samples.   As a 
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result of these corrections, we can have more confidence that results may be attributed to institutional 
differences. 
The comparison of Dutch and US firms’ derivatives practices is interesting because the institutional 
setting for Dutch firms differs from the US setting in four areas likely to influence risk management 
practices.  First, shareholder orientation is a strong influence for US firms  whereas Dutch firms are 
oriented more toward multiple stakeholders.  In the Netherlands shareholders have limited influence on 
firms and thus their views on financial risk management receive less weight, while other stakeholders 
with less of a value interest in the firm may prefer to see more risk management.  Second, the Dutch 
economy is much more open than the US economy, suggesting a greater risk exposure to international 
financial price fluctuations for Dutch firms.  As Dutch firms experience more international trade flows 
than US firms do, a greater emphasis on currency exposure and foreign exchange risk hedging policies by 
Dutch firms is expected.  Third, distinct differences in accounting regulations between the US and the 
Netherlands exist.  While US firms are bound to disclosure requirements according to the FASB 
regulations, Dutch firms are not legally obliged to publish information on derivatives usage in their 
annual reports.  As external reporting often drives internal accounting procedures, one would expect 
stricter internal control and reporting procedures in the US than in the Netherlands.  Fourth, Dutch firms 
traditionally have close ties with commercial banks whereas US firms tend to rely on a broader array of 
financial institutions and exchanges.  This difference in counter-parties for derivatives transactions may 
influence risk management practices.  With these distinct differences in institutional background, we are 
interested to examine carefully the differences and similarities in derivatives usage and risk management 
practices between US and Dutch firms.  The characteristics of Dutch firms are found in many other 
continental European countries.  Therefore, our analysis also suggests a broader comparison between US 
and European firms. 
For the US derivatives usage data we use survey data from the 1998 Wharton Survey of Financial Risk 
Management (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston, 1998).  This data set contains responses of 399 (response rate 
of 20.7%) US firms from early 1998.  For information on Dutch firms’ derivatives usage, we conducted a 
survey among Dutch exchange -listed firms using questions similar to those in the US survey.  The Dutch 
survey, carried out in 1998, was sent to 167 firms and produced 84 usable responses, yielding a response 
rate of 50.3%.  All firms in both surveys are non-financial firms.  In order to create similar size and 
industry distributions in the US and the Dutch samples, we attach a weight to each US firm.  The 
weighting of the US firms is based on the relative presence of firms with a similar size and industry 
classification found in the Dutch sample.   
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Our results indicate that Dutch firms use derivatives more often to hedge financial risk than US firms for 
all size and industry classes.  Notably, Dutch firms indicate a greater exposure to foreign exchange risk 
than US firms; a result that is undoubtedly driven by the fact that the Dutch economy is much more open 
than the US economy.  We also find that Dutch firms show a lower level of concern with respect to a 
variety of derivatives usage issues than US firms.  This result is consistent with more active minority 
shareholders monitoring the fiduciary responsibility of the management and stricter disclosure 
requirements in the US.  Furthermore, Dutch firms are less likely to incorporate their own views or act 
opportunistically when engaging in derivatives transactions than are US firms.  This may be related to the 
greater shareholder orientation of US firms and the increased pressure that exists to contribute to the 
bottom line on a quarterly basis.  Dutch firms are less worried about counter-party risk than US firms and 
demonstrate this by being almost twice as likely to not have a policy regarding counter-party rating than 
US firms.  This result is consistent with Dutch firms relying on tight relations with a few highly rated 
banks for their derivatives transactions  ensuring that counter-party risk is not a troubling issue.  Of firms 
that do not use derivatives, the Dutch firms are much less likely than the US firms to link this to 
accounting treatment of derivatives, concerns about perceptions of derivatives usage by outsiders, or a 
view that the cost of hedging exceeds the benefit, but more likely to link non-usage to derivatives pricing 
and valuing difficulties or othe r reasons.  These results again are consistent with a Dutch environment that 
is less concerned about outside perceptions of firm decisions and value generation.   
The paper is organized as follows.  In section II, we discuss recent work on derivatives surveys and some 
of the theoretical issues relating to cross sectional differences in usage.  Section III presents our data sets 
and explains the matching and weighting procedures.  In section IV, we investigate the similarities and 
differences between the overall derivatives usage and risk management practices of Dutch and US firms.  
In section V currency risk is examined and in section VI control and reporting procedures are 
investigated.  Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  The impact of the institutional setting on risk management 
Several survey studies have investigated derivatives usage for risk management purposes in the US.  
Early studies include Block and Gallagher (1986) and Dolde (1993).  More recently, Philips (1995) and a 
series of Wharton Surveys (Bodnar, Hayt, Marston and Smithson (1995) and Bodnar, Hayt and Marston 
(1996, 1998)) have described risk management practices of US firms.  The aim of the Wharton Surveys 
was to provide a detailed description of risk management practices, such as derivatives usage, motives for 
usage and non-usage, exposures, concerns, reporting and control policies for a large scale random cross-
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section of US non-financial firms.  Together these studies have produced a reasonable picture of 
derivatives use among US firms.  Roughly speaking only one out of two US firms uses derivatives, with 
usage heavily tilted toward large firms.  US firms indicate that their key motive behind financial hedging 
is to decrease the volatility of the cash flows.  Stabilizing accounting earnings is a close second.  Foreign 
exchange risk is the most commonly hedged risk using derivatives, followed by interest rate risk.  
Additionally, the studies find that risk management activities are largely centralized and the hedging 
horizon is often limited to one  year or less.   
The results of the US studies suggest that risk management practices are influenced by firms’ shareholder 
wealth maximization objectives.  This objective also underlies the justification for risk management in the 
theoretical literature, i.e. risk management with derivative instruments can increase shareholder value (see 
Stulz (1984) Smith and Stulz (1985) and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993)).  Firms can decrease cash 
flow volatility by hedging financial risks such as currency, interest rate and commodity risk.  By reducing 
the volatility of cash flows, firms decrease expected taxes, agency costs and costs of financial distress, 
thus enhancing future expected cash flows.  In addition, hedging can improve the probability of sufficient 
internal funds being available for planned investments, eliminating the need to either cut profitable 
projects or bear the extra costs of obtaining external funding.  If the costs of using financial derivatives, 
such as employee salaries, computers, training and facilities, and transaction costs, are less than the 
benefits provided via the avenues mentioned above, or any other benefit perceived by the market, then 
derivatives use will be a shareholder-value enhancing activity.   
The empirical literature on risk management initially focused exclusively on US firms.  Of course, 
derivative instruments are used worldwide for risk management purposes.  Additional countries have been 
investigated in a number of studies.  Berkman, Bradbury and Magan (1997) study derivatives usage in 
New Zealand.  They find that, in comparison with US firms, New Zealand firms hedge more financial risk 
across all size categories.  They attribute this finding to a higher currency risk exposure in New Zealand.  
Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) study derivatives usage in Sweden.  They used a questionnaire to gather 
data from all exchange listed non-financial firms with headquarters in Sweden.  The responses are directly 
compared with the results of the surveys of Bodnar, Hayt, Marston and Smithson (1995) and Bodnar, 
Hayt and Marston (1996) without controlling for differences in size or industry classification.  The 
Swedish survey finds that the lack of knowledge about derivatives within the firm is the main concern of 
Swedish firms.  In contrast, this issue is of least concern to US firms.  De Ceuster, Durinck, Laveren and 
Lodewyckx (2000) sent a questionnaire to coordination centers (which are often used as financial 
vehicles) and to the largest firms in Belgium.  Their survey does not discriminate between financial and 
non-financial firms.  They notice that, opposed to empirical findings in the US, Belgian firms focus their 
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hedging strategies more on reducing earnings volatility than on reducing cash flow volatility.  Mallin, 
Ow-Yong and Reynolds (2001) sent a questionnaire to the financial directors of 800 UK non-financial 
listed firms.  They find that the primary objective cited by the firms for using derivatives is to manage 
fluctuations in accounting earnings, a view that is inconsistent with t heoretical arguments on risk 
management.  Loderer and Pichler (2000) have a slightly different approach compared to the previously 
mentioned surveys.  They examine the currency risk management practices of Swiss exchange-listed 
firms.  They find that these firms are unable to quantify their exposure to currency risk.  All studies above 
focus their empirical analysis on a single country and make comparisons only indirectly without insuring 
similarity of questions or responding samples.  This makes it difficult to draw meaningful comparisons, 
especially if one is interested in examining whether differences in usage are related in logical ways to 
differences in the institutional and informational environments.  An example of a study that tries to do 
this is Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999).  They compare derivatives usage between US and German firms 
using the responses from the 1995 Wharton Survey and an identical survey of German public firms 
(Gebhardt and Russ, 1999).  Their results indicate that more German firms than US firms use derivatives.  
The primary goal of hedging differs as German firms focus more on managing accounting results whereas 
US firms tend to focus on managing cash flows.  Furthermore, German firms appear less concerned about 
all issues with respect to derivatives usage than US firms.  Although this study provides comparative 
information on risk management practices inside and outside the US setting, it is not a very sophisticated 
comparison between US and non-US firms.  The two samples are matched across industries, but they are 
different with respect to size and industry distribution.  Therefore, the Bodnar and Gebhardt approach is 
not ideal for trying to isolate the impact of the institutional environment as observed differences might be 
attributed to differences in the institutional settings as well as differences in firm size and industry 
classification between countries.   
In this paper, we survey the risk management activities of firms in the Netherlands using a survey 
identical to that used in the 1998 Wharton Survey (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston 1998).  We then compare 
these results with the results from US firms.  The unique feature of this study is that the results are 
compared in a more precise way using a weighting scheme for the US results across firm size and 
industry classification that produces a US sample with the same size and industry characteristics as the 
Dutch sample.  Thus, we can make comparisons where the primary factor is the influence of institutional 
differences.  The Netherlands is a suitable choice for this sort of investigation because in terms of 
corporate setting ,it is distinctly different than the US, but resembles other continental European 
countries.   
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The US and the Dutch corporate environments differ in four major areas.  First, shareholder orientation is 
a common characteristic for US firms, whereas Dutch firms are oriented toward multiple stakeholders  
meaning shareholders have less influence on firm’s decisions.  This issue is demonstrated by the fact that 
the results of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) place the Netherlands and the US in groups 
with respectively low and high shareholder rights.  Furthermore, in the Netherlands listed firms have a 
two-tier board structure consisting of an Executive Board and a Supervisory Board.  The Supervisory 
Board members have the legal obligation to consider the interests of the firm as a whole, limiting 
shareholder orientation.  This difference in shareholder-stakeholder orientation could lead to some 
interesting differences in the area of the hedging horizon.  For example, US firms might be expected to be 
more short term oriented, focused on hedging transaction risk and anticipated transactions within a period 
of one year (or the budget period), whereas Dutch firms might be expected to focus on a longer time span.   
Second, the Dutch economy is much more open to international influences than the US economy.  In 
1998, Dutch exports were 50.4% of GDP, while imports were 46.7% of GDP.  In contrast, US exports 
were only 9.2% of GDP while imports were only 12.8% of GDP (United Nations, 1999).  As Dutch firms 
experience proportionally larger international trade and capital flows than US firms do, a greater 
emphasis on currency exposure and foreign exchange risk hedging policies by Dutch firms is expected.   
Third, distinct differences in accounting regulations between the US and the Netherlands exist.  While US 
firms are bound to disclosure requirements according to the FASB regulations (see FASB, SFAS No 115, 
119 and 133), Dutch firms are not legally obliged to publish information on derivatives usage in their 
annual reports (see Blij et al., 1997).  As annual reports originate from internal accounting procedures, 
one can expect that internal control and reporting procedures are stricter in the US than in the 
Netherlands.  We also predict that the level of concern regarding derivatives transactions will be higher at 
US firms due to the distinct differences in disclosure requirements.   
Fourth, Dutch firms traditionally have close ties with commercial banks (see Boersma and Veld, 1995) as 
counter-parties for derivatives transactions.  While US firms also rely on commercial banks for 
derivatives, they have a much wider array of counter-parties for derivatives transactions, such as 
investment banks, special purpose vehicles, insurance companies or exchanges (see Bodnar and Gebhardt, 
1999).  This difference may influence risk management practices.  We expect that the difference between 
counter-parties in both countries will be most pronounced in the area of counter-party rating.  US firms 
will require higher counter-party ratings, for both short and long term derivatives transactions.  
Furthermore, because of the linkage with commercial banks, we expect Dutch firms to use OTC 
derivatives more frequently than US firms.   
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Considering these distinct differences between the US and Dutch institutional backgrounds, we are 
interested to examine the differences and similarities in derivatives usage and risk management practices 
between US a nd Dutch firms.  Moreover, the characteristics of Dutch firms are representative of other 
continental European countries and may act as a baseline from which to generalize. 
 
III.  Comparative sample selection and weighting procedures 
The US survey data we use is from the 1998 Wharton Survey of Financial Risk Management by Non-
Financial Firms (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston, 1998).  The questionnaire was mailed to just under 2000 US 
exchange-listed non-financial firms in October 1997.  A second mailing was done in March 1998.  399 
firms responded generating a response rate of 20.7%.  The majority of the US sample was randomly 
selected; however,  it also contained the additional (non-financial) Fortune 500 firms not already part of 
the random sample.  Responses from these additional firms are excluded from the comparison in this 
paper.1 This questionnaire was translated into Dutch and sent to all listed non-financial Dutch firms in 
November 1998.  A follow-up was mailed in December 1998.  Of the total of 167 Dutch listed non-
financial firms, 84 returned a usable response, which corresponds with a response rate of 50.3%. 
In order to generate comparable samples from the US and Dutch questionnaires we both match and weigh 
the responses based on industry classification and firm size.  We match in order to remove firms in one 
country for which no comparables exist in the other country.  We weigh the remaining firms because 
previous studies have shown that hedging practices are influenced by a firm’s industry classification and 
by a firm’s size.  Therefore, we weigh observations in order to correct for differences in the distribution 
over size and industry classes between the US and the Netherlands. 
We first match the samples on industry classification by using the two-digit SIC-codes of US and Dutch 
firms.  In total 102 US firms had SIC-codes that were not present among the Dutch firms that received a 
questionnaire.  These 102 firms were removed from the sample.  No Dutch firm had a SIC-code that was 
not represented in the US sample.  Finally, we matched the two samples on firm size by eliminating two 
US firms with a turnover of more than US$ 63 billion, which is the turnover of the largest Dutch non-
financial listed firm.  We also eliminated three US firms with zero or unknown turnover.  After this 
matching procedure, 267 US and 84 Dutch firms remained for further analyses.  In Table 1, we present 
the matched distributions in the US and the Netherlands over size and industry classes. 
                                                
1 The inclusion of these responses would have biased the sample towards the larger Fortune 500 firms.   
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The results in Table  1 clearly illustrate that the composition of the US sample differs from the Dutch 
sample.  For example, 27% of the US firms are large manufacturers, while only 15% of the Dutch firms 
are in this class.  On the other hand, 12% of the Dutch firms are small trading firms, in comparison with 
only 3% of the US firms.  Because these differences between the US and the Dutch samples are likely to 
influence our findings, we apply a weighting scheme to the US firms, based on the relative presence of 
similar firms in the Dutch data set.  The weights are applied in order to more accurately compare the 
samples.  The number of US firms in a particular group is compared to the number Dutch firms in that 
same group.  If there are relatively more (less) US firms than Dutch firms in a specific group, then the US 
firms in that class receive a weight of less than one (more than one).  Groups are defined based upon two 
criteria.  The first criterion is firm size (i.e., large, medium and small).  Large firms have total sales of 
more than US$ 800 million, medium firms have total sales between US$ 250 million and US$ 800 
million and small firms have total sales of less than US$ 250 million (we use US$ 1= DFL 1.90 for 
comparison).  The second criterion is sector (i.e., manufacturing, trade or services).  
  
We calculate separate weights for three specific sub-samples of firms: firms that indicate using 
derivatives to hedge financial risk in general, firms that indicate hedging currency risk and firms that 
indicate that they do not hedge financial risk. 2  The purpose of our weighting schemes is to adjust the 
results, removing size and sector effects to increase the likelihood that the explanation for any remaining 
differences is confined to the institutional setting.  In our discussion of the results, we always mention in 
the tables and figures whether weighting (and if so which weighting) is applied.  
 
IV.  Overall derivatives usage  
A. Derivatives Users  
In this section we compare the responses on derivatives usage of the US and Dutch firms and also look 
into the reasons firms put forward for not using derivatives.  We start this section using unweighted 
                                                
2 Alternatively, a weighting based on nine classes (three size classes times three industry classes) may be used.  For example, 
there are 73 US and 13 Dutch firms that are part of the class large and manufacturers.  In this particular class the proportion of 
US versus Dutch firms is 5.62 (73 US firms against 13 Dutch firms).  The total US sample outnumbers the Dutch sample by a 
multiple of 3.18 (267 US firms versus 84 Dutch firms).  Therefore, the relative weight of the US firms in this group is 0.57 
(=3.18/5.62).  This result closely resembles our procedure.  However, sub-sampling into hedgers, non-hedgers and currency 
hedgers leads to smaller sample sizes and in some of the nine classes no firms are included.  Because the use of nine classes is not 
possible in these cases, we did not use this method. 
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samples.  We first examine the overall derivatives usage of US and Dutch firms discriminating between 
size and industry classification.  We then examine the types of financial risk US and Dutch firms hedge, 
the motivation firms put forward for managing financial risk and the types of derivatives firms use.  
Furthermore, the risks US and Dutch firms perceive with respect to derivatives usage  are evaluated.  The 
section concludes with an investigation into the reasons  firms do not use derivatives.   
We begin by examining the differences in derivatives usage between US and Dutch firms.  Because 
derivatives use is influenced, often considerably, by the size of the firm and the sector in which it 
operates, we distinguish between size and sector classification.  Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of the 
(unweighted) US and Dutch derivatives use by size and sector classification respectively.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 shows that 60% of the Dutch firms use derivatives against 44% of the US firms.  The derivatives 
usage of Dutch firms is higher for all size groups.  The difference in derivatives usage between US and 
Dutch firms decreases  as firm size increases.  The large US and Dutch firms have similar usage rates 
(82% against 88%).  For the medium size group the difference is 11% (46% for US firms against 57% for 
Dutch firms) and for small firms the difference is 30% (12% for US firms versus 42% for Dutch firms).  
The fact that the usage rate of derivatives drops significantly when firm size decreases may be explained 
by decreasing economies of scale regarding the investment in employees, training, computers, facilities, 
etc.  Notwithstanding the economies of scale argument, the large difference between small US and Dutch 
firms’ derivatives usage remains apparent and may be due to differences in the degree of openness 
between the US and Dutch economy.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 indicates that the derivatives usage of Dutch firms is larger across all sectors.  The difference in 
derivatives use is small in the services sector (7%), but more notable in the manufacturing sector (20%).  
The difference in the trade sector is most pronounced (31%).  As mentioned above, a possible explanation 
for this across the board difference is the openness of the Dutch market, which exhibits more international 
trade compared to more national trade in the US.  Table 3 also indicates that in the US, manufacturing 
firms (75% of all respondents) are more heavily represented than in the Netherlands (52% of all 
respondents).  Table 2 already demonstrated that in the Netherlands medium firms (27% of all 
respondents) are more represented than in the US (18% of all respondents).  These differences, combined 
 10
with the fact that both sector and size are found to influence derivatives usage, stress the added value of 
our weighting system. 
Next to measuring the usage rate of derivatives, it is also important to know which financial risks, such as 
foreign exchange, interest rate and commodity risk, US and Dutch firms hedge with derivatives.3 Table 4 
shows the respondents’ answers to our query.  For this question, we apply weights to the US firms that 
indicate using derivatives.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
The results of the comparison indicate that of the US firms  hedging financial risk with derivatives, 79% 
hedge currency risk.  In contrast, nearly all the Dutch firms that hedge financial risk, 96%, hedge currency 
risk.  The higher level of openness of the Dutch economy likely explains this difference.  With interest 
rate risk, which is not as affected by openness, but where firms in the two countries are more likely to 
face similar levels of risk, we find little difference in the percentage of use.  A slightly higher percentage 
of Dutch derivatives users, 81%, use interest rate derivatives compared to 73% of the US firms.  A far 
lower percentage of Dutch derivatives users hedge commodity risk, 20% , compared to 44% of US firms.  
This could be due to the greater development and longer history of exchange-traded derivatives in the US 
combined with the fact that most commodity derivatives are exchange traded.   
As derivatives are purportedly used to hedge financial risk, we are interested to compare the motives 
behind the risk management practices of the US and Dutch firms.  According to theory, firms benefit 
from hedging by reducing the volatility in the firm’s cash flows.  By reducing the volatility of cash flows 
specific costs can be decreased (such as the bankruptcy costs, expected taxes, and agency costs) which in 
turn increases firm value.  Table 5 shows the results of a question asking firms what volatility they are 
trying to manage by hedging.  Firms could choose from the following three answers: volatility in 
accounting earnings, volatility in cash flows or balance sheet accounts or ratios.4  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 reveals that slightly more Dutch (60%) than US firms (50%) indicate that managing the volatility 
of their cash flows is the most important focus.  More US firms (44%) than Dutch firms (33%) indicate 
managing the volatility in accounting earnings as being most important.  This difference appears 
consistent with the fact that shareholder concerns are more important in the US than they are in the 
                                                
3 As no Dutch firm indicates hedging equity risk we will not examine this type of financial risk in detail. 
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Netherlands.  Further, notice the difference in the percentage of US and Dutch firms indicating that 
managing the volatility in accounting earnings is “not at all important” or  ”not a consideration”, 7% 
versus 23%.  This is also consistent with the view that US firms are more shareholder-oriented while 
Dutch firms are more stakeholder-oriented.  This is the case because shareholders generally define good 
performance in terms of accounting earnings rather than in terms of cash flow.  For both US and Dutch 
firms managing balance sheet accounts or ratios is obviously not an important reason for their hedging 
programs as respectively 88% and 66% indicate this as being not at all important or not a consideration or 
being least important.   
The US and Dutch financial environments differ regarding counter-parties for derivatives transactions.  In 
the US, firms have a broader choice of counter-parties. Not only do exchanges offer a more extensive 
range of derivatives, but a large number of banks and other financial institutions offer over-the-counter 
(OTC) products as well.  In the Netherlands, firms have close relations with banks who are in turn their 
primary providers of derivatives instruments.  We are interested in whether this institutional difference 
influences the preferences among the types of derivatives US and Dutch firms use.5 Table 6 shows which 
derivatives the firms consider most important for hedging their currency, interest rate and commodity 
risk. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Regarding types of derivatives for hedging currency risk, the majority of US firms, 56%, and Dutch firms, 
77%, prefer OTC forward contracts, with OTC options the next most preferred instrument for both 
countries.   In contrast to US firms, no Dutch firm used either futures or exchange-traded options.  
Regarding types of derivatives for managing interest rate risk, swaps are the most preferred instrument, 
but are more strongly preferred by US firms, 78%, than Dutch firms, 52%.  Dutch firms are more likely, 
28% against 4%, to favor OTC interest rate forward contracts while US firms indicate a greater 
preference, 12% vs. 0%, for structured (multi-component) derivatives and hybrid debt (debt with 
imbedded options).  Regarding types of derivatives for managing commodity risk, US firms preferred 
futures contracts (40%) , whereas most Dutch firms (35%) indicated preference for OTC options.  In 
contrast to exchange rate and interest rate risk,  Dutch firms are more likely than US firms to prefer 
exchange traded options and structured derivatives for managing commodity risk.    Despite this small 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 This question was not included in the survey of Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998).  Therefore, we use the results of the previous 
questionnaire (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston, 1996).  Consequently, the results are unmatched and unweighted. 
5 This question was part of the 1995 Wharton survey (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston, 1996), but not included in the 1998 Wharton 
survey (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998)).  Therefore, we use the US results from the 1995 Wharton survey in comparison to the 
Dutch responses.  Consequently, the results to this specific question are unmatched and unweighted. 
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difference, the results suggest a general pattern of Dutch firms showing a stronger preference than  US 
firms for over-the-counter instruments that come from banks.   
While derivatives usage can be beneficial in that it can lower financial risks, the relative newness of 
widespread derivatives use and the possibility  of incomplete user and stakeholder understanding raise 
concerns as new risks associated with the use of derivatives arise.  We next compare the degree to which 
US and Dutch firms indicate concern about a range of issues related to derivatives use.  For this question, 
we apply a set of weights based on the sample of US firms indicating derivatives usage.   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates that the level of concern about derivatives issues is higher among US firms than 
among Dutch firms.  This is in line with our expectation due to the stricter external accounting and 
disclosure regulations and the greater risk of corporate litigation for insufficient fiduciary care in the US.  
Of the US firms, 76% have a high or moderate level of concern regarding external disclosure 
requirements against only 12% of the Dutch firms.  This corresponds with the stricter disclosure 
requirements in the US and recent changes in the disclosure rules.  Again supporting the accounting 
earning issues from above, internal accounting treatment is of high or moderate concern to 75% of US 
hedgers, while only one quarter of hedgers in the Netherlands indicate a similar level of concern and 48% 
indicate that it is no concern at all.  Monitoring and evaluating hedge results and market risk of hedges are 
the issues that concern the most Dutch firms with 26% and 27%, respectively, indicating high or moderate 
concern.   Nevertheless, the concern of Dutch firms on these issues is well below that of US firms at 63% 
and 64%, respectively.   
B. Derivatives Non-Users  
In addition to examining the reasons for using derivatives, it is also interesting to investigate the reasons 
firms put forward for not using them.  Both US and Dutch firms not using derivatives were asked to 
indicate the three most important reasons for their decision.  For this question, we use a set of weights 
based on the sample of respondents that indicate not using derivatives.  Figure 2 below presents an 
overview of the answers to this question.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 2 points out that the common reason in both countries for not using derivatives is insufficient 
exposure to financial risk.  Of the American respondents that report not using derivatives, 58% indicate 
insufficient exposure as being the most important reason and 16% indicate it as the second most important 
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reason.  Insufficient exposure is the most important reason for not using derivatives for 67% of the Dutch 
firms and is the second most important reason for another 15%.  To see whether the argument of 
insufficient exposure is valid, we examine the responses to the questions about the percentage of 
operating revenues and costs in foreign currency.  The responses from the questionnaires show that 59% 
of the US non-hedgers have no operating revenues in foreign currencies and 52% have no operating costs 
in foreign currencies.  Thus, it appears consistent that around 58% of US non-users may have insufficient 
exposure to use derivatives.  For the Dutch firms the picture is different.  Of the Dutch non-users, only 
19% indicate no operating revenues in foreign currencies and a mere 15% indicate no operating costs in 
foreign currency.  Moreover, 29% of the Dutch firms not using derivatives indicate having at least 50% of 
their total operating revenues in foreign currencies and 24% indicate that at least 50% of their total 
operating costs are in foreign currencies .  Therefore, the fact that 67% and 15% of the Dutch firms 
indicate that their most important and second most important reason for not hedging is based on 
insufficient exposure, suggests that these firms must be naturally hedged in that their revenues and costs 
in foreign currency are reasonably balanced.   
Additionally, as 6% of the US firms and 4% of the Dutch firms indicate that exposures are more 
effectively managed by other means, some of the foreign exchange exposure may be shed by means other 
than by using derivatives.  Operational hedging, for instance, by moving factories to countries where 
foreign currency revenues are incurred, or financing in the foreign currency, may be alternative strategies 
to using derivatives.  Also, part of operating revenues and costs may be in the same foreign currency, 
thereby reducing the total foreign currency exposure to a tolerable level without using derivatives. 
Only 3% of the US firms indicate that external disclosure requirements are the most important reason for 
not us ing derivatives against 0% of the Dutch firms.  The US result is striking given the fact that 22% of 
the US firms indicate being highly concerned about external disclosure requirements (see Figure 1).  As 
there were no disclosure requirements on derivatives usage in the Netherlands during the time of the 
questionnaire, the Dutch result is fully in line with our expectations.  While accounting treatment is a 
minor reason for US firms for not using derivatives, for Dutch firms it is not important at all.   
 
V.  Currency exposure  
In this section, we investigate foreign currency risk management practices.  In order to facilitate a 
comparison between the US and Dutch results, we apply weights in this section based on the sample of 
US firms that specifically indicate using currency derivatives.  We first compare the differences in foreign 
 14
currency operating revenues and costs between US and Dutch firms, as a basis for measuring the size of 
the exposure.  Next, as the effectiveness of a hedging program requires using a benchmark, we examine 
the use of a benchmark for hedging currency risk.  Then, we compare the types of foreign currency 
exposure that the US and Dutch firms claim to be hedging and the horizon over which they are hedging.  
Finally, we look into whether managers are willing to incorporate their personal views when making 
derivatives transaction decisions. 
Because the Netherlands has a much more open economy than the US, we expect foreign exchange 
exposure of Dutch firms, as measured by the foreign currency revenues and expenses, to be higher than 
that of US firms.  We asked the firms to indicate their foreign currency operating revenues and costs.  The 
tables below show the results from these questions. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
The results affirm our hypothesis: whereas all Dutch firms have at least 10% of operating revenues and 
costs in foreign currency , a full 26% of US firms have foreign currency operating revenues less than 10% 
and 33% have foreign currency operating costs less than 10%.  Not surprisingly, Dutch firms display 
substantially more foreign currency activity than do US firms.6 If firms use derivatives in order to hedge 
currency risk, it seems quite natural to expect those firms to use a benchmark for the evaluation of their 
risk management practices.  When questioned about this, only 40% of the Dutch firms versus 57% of the 
US firms that hedge currency risk indicated having or using a benchmark to evaluate their hedging 
strategy.  The greater use of a benchmark for evaluating  currency risk management practices in the US is 
consistent with a greater formality of hedging programs and concern over demonstrating sufficient 
fiduciary responsibility. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
We are also interested to know whether US and Dutch firms differ with respect to the types of foreign 
currency exposures they hedge.   Firms can hedge various exposures, such as translation exposure that 
arises from consolidating foreign currency operations, on-balance sheet commitments that arise from 
contracts and which are already recorded in their internal accounting system, or anticipated future foreign 
currency cash flows that are hedged in advance.  On a strategic level firms may hedge long term 
economic exposure, which originates from changes in the competitive position of the firm resulting from 
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exchange rate changes.  Figure 3 displays the responses to questions about the kind of currency risks that 
firms in the two countries hedge. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates that a higher percentage of Dutch firms frequently hedge short term currency 
exposures, such as repatriations, on- and off-balance sheet commitments and anticipated transactions 
shorter than one year, than do US firms.  The picture reverses when considering longer-term exposures 
such as anticipated transactions over one year and economic/competitive exposure.  A slightly higher 
percentage of US firms hedge these types of foreign exchange exposures frequently in comparison with 
Dutch firms.  The fact that only a small percentage of US and Dutch firms frequently hedge anticipated 
transactions over a year and economic/competitive exposure is surprising given predictions of financial 
theory that suggests that firms can increase their value when hedging financial risk.  In this regard, 
generally economic/competitive exposure is the most important type of exposure for firms to hedge.   
As for hedging translation exposure, compared with Dutch firms a higher percentage of US firms report 
hedging translation exposure frequently.  Hedging translation exposure, which implies hedging balance 
sheet accounts, smoothes the balance sheet but is technically less likely to increase shareholder value as it 
does not necessarily stabilize the firm’s cash flows.  The fact that more US firms hedge translation 
exposure could be correlated with the shareholder and market orientation of US firms as outside investors 
are more likely to provide capital to firms with more stable balance sheets. 
In addition to the types of currency exposure they hedge, we also asked the US and Dutch firms to 
comment on their hedging horizon for foreign exchange risk management.  Table 9 below shows that for 
all types of foreign exchange risk classes, hedging the maturity of the exposure is most common for both 
US and Dutch firms.   
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
Both US and Dutch firms are likely to hedge contractual commitments and anticipated transactions to the 
maturity of the exposure, with a slight bias toward under hedging the maturity as opposed to over hedging 
it.  The tendency to under hedge the maturity of the exposure increases with economic/competitive 
exposure.  While no US firm hedges economic/competitive exposure for longer than the maturity of the 
exposure, to our surprise,  in the Netherlands 15% of the firms hedging economic/competitive exposure 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 At the time of the questionnaire (1998), the Euro was not yet introduced.  Even though exchange rate movements between 
prospective Euro participants were already limited in 1998, the current foreign exchange exposure for Dutch firms may be lower 
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indicate doing so.   Respectively 19% and 15% of the US and Dutch firms hedge economic/competitive 
exposure to the end of the budget/fiscal year which contradicts economic theory as the horizon of 
economic exposure reaches beyond a budget or fiscal year.  This suggests an earnings management focus 
to hedging.  The fact that 26% of US firms and 40% of Dutch firms hedge translation risk to the end of 
the budget/fiscal year is not as surprising as this is an exposure defined by accounting cycles and can be 
successfully controlled in annual increments.    
When hedging foreign currency exposure, managers may also be tempted to incorporate their views on 
foreign exchange rate changes in order to try to outperform the market and make a profit.  We asked the 
US and Dutch firms whether their views on exchange rate movements influenced their behavior with 
respect to foreign currency derivatives transactions. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
Table 10 illustrates that US firms are more willing to incorporate their views on foreign exchange rate 
changes than are Dutch firms. Eight percent of the US firms versus 5% of the Dutch firms frequently alter 
the timing of hedges based on  market view.  A similar pattern is found for altering the size of hedges 
based upon a specific view, with 9% of US firms frequently incorporating their market view against 7% 
of the Dutch firms.  As for actively taking outright positions based upon a view, more than one third of 
the US firms indicate that they sometimes or frequently do so, while less than one quarter of the Dutch 
firms indicate doing so.  As it is very difficult to outperform the market consistently, this behavior, under 
the guise of hedging, may lead to increased rather than less financial risk.  The conclusion drawn is that 
US firms are willing to take more risk than Dutch firms and therefore behave more speculatively when 
foreign exchange rate movements are viewed as likely to be favorable.  This behavior is consistent with 
the shareholder orientation in the US as US firms have more pressure to consistently show a good 
quarterly performance.   
 
VI.  Control and reporting procedures 
In this section, we investigate issues regarding control and reporting procedures.  Again, we apply a set of 
weights based on the sample of US respondents that indicate using derivatives.  The use of derivatives 
incorporates specific risks as derivatives positions can reach a magnitude far beyond the value of 
positions arising from normal business activities.  Therefore, it is apparent that good control measures and 
                                                                                                                                                        
than during the pre-Euro era.   
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reporting procedures should be in place.  Because US accounting rules (FASB) regarding external 
disclosure requirements in annual reports on derivatives activities are stricter than those in the 
Netherlands, we are interested to find out whether these differences are confirmed when investigating the 
internal control and reporting systems of US and Dutch firms.  We examine the usage rate of a 
documented policy and the frequency of reporting on derivatives activities.  We also investigate the 
preference for a centralized versus a decentralized approach to risk management activities, look into the 
minimum counter-party rating firms require, and examine how frequently the firms evaluate (re-value) 
their derivatives portfolios.  We conclude this section by examining which benchmark the firms prefer for 
evaluating their risk management function.   
A basic control tool for derivatives usage is the use of a documented policy.  Considering the stricter 
derivatives disclosure requirements in the US, the more litig ious nature of the stakeholders, and the 
prevalence of recent corporate “train wrecks” with respect to derivatives, we expect a higher percentage 
of US firms to have a documented derivatives usage policy than Dutch firms.   Indeed, 73% of the US 
firms compared to 66% of the Dutch firms indicate  they have a documented policy.  However, 
considering the risks associated with derivatives usage, such as market, counter-party and liquidity risks, 
it is remarkable that the percentage of both US and Dutch firms that report having a documented policy is 
not higher.    
Whereas a documented policy defines the boundaries for derivatives usage, the frequency of reporting to 
the Board of Directors (US) or the Executive Board (Netherlands) forms the active control of top 
management on the compliance of the derivatives usage (to the documented policy).  Furthermore, it 
provides the management with insight as to the actual level of financial risk the firm has to bear.  Because 
of the stricter external disclosure requirements and the legal liability of the directors, we expect US firms 
to report on derivatives usage to the board more frequently than do Dutch firms.   
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
In contrast to these priors, we find that 47% of Dutch firms report to the Executive Board on either a 
monthly (27%) or quarterly (20%) basis, whereas only 21% of US firms report to the Board of Directors 
on either a monthly (6%) or on a quarterly (15%) basis.  While 18% of the US firms report only annually, 
none of the Dutch firms indicated this frequency.   Most US firms, 56%, indicate that they report “as 
needed” or “have no set schedule” against 39% of Dutch firms in these categories.  Although Dutch firms 
are by law not required to provide extensive information on derivatives usage in annual reports, these 
figures suggest that Dutch boards demand more frequent insight into derivatives positions than do US 
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boards.  For the US firms it seems that the stricter external reporting requirements on derivatives usage do 
not lead to stricter internal reporting measures by the board.  This may be because sufficient firm policies 
are in place to allow for relatively more self-management.  
We also investigate the approach firms take to risk management activities, in terms of a centralized or 
decentralized decision structure for risk management decisions.  The firms could choose from three risk 
management approaches: primarily centralized, primarily decentralized or primarily decentralized with 
centralized coordination.  Table 11 presents the responses of the US and Dutch firms to this question for 
each separate form of risk; currency, interest rate and commodity. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
Table 11 shows that for all three types of financial risk a centralized approach is preferred by both US and 
Dutch firms.  This strong preference for a centralized approach suggests that economies of scale in risk 
management activities, such as the number of employees, knowledge, training, computers and facilities, 
are involved.  With regard to currency risk management in particular, there is some bias toward Dutch 
firms allowing more decentralization, with 21% of the Dutch firms having decentralized activities versus 
12% for the US. 
One important aspect of  derivatives control  is counter-party risk (the possibility that the other party will 
not deliver on their side of the transaction).  The financial environment in the US and the Netherlands 
regarding counter-parties for derivatives is quite different.  In the Netherlands, counter-parties for 
derivatives contracts are more likely to be banks (see section IV on the types of derivatives used), while 
in the US there are a wider variety and larger number of financial institutions and exchanges able to act as 
counter-parties.  One way to measure the risk of a counter-party  is via its credit rating (AAA, AA, A 
BBB, etc.).  Because rating agencies in the US have more influence than in the Netherlands, we expect 
US firms to be generally more aware of the differences in ratings and to require a higher counter-party 
rating than do Dutch firms.  We asked the US and Dutch firms about the lowest rated counter-party with 
which they would enter a derivatives transaction.  As counter-party risk increases with the lengthening of 
the derivative maturity, we distinguish between maturities shorter than one year and maturities longer 
than one year.  The responses are shown in Table 12.   
[Insert Table 12 here] 
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The first point to note is that between a fifth and a quarter of US firms and nearly 40% of Dutch firms 
have either no set policy on counter-party rating or the respondent doesn’t know of one.  While not that 
surprising for Dutch firms dealing mainly with banks, it is surprising for US firms.  For maturities of less 
than one year, all US and Dutch firms report that they do not engage in derivatives transactions with 
counter-parties rated below “BBB”.  Forty-seven percent of US firms and 33% of Dutch firms indicate a 
minimum counter-party rating of “A” .  For derivatives maturities of more than one year, 78% of US 
firms require a counter-party rating of “AAA, AA or A” against 61% of the Dutch firms.  These figures 
indicate that US firms are more likely to have credit rating policies and impose more strict credit rating 
limits on counter-parties do Dutch firms.  This is in line with our view that counter-party ratings are more 
important in the US than in the Netherlands.  Nonetheless, it is striking that in both countries a large 
percentage of firms does not explicitly consider counter-party risk. 
Another control mechanism for derivatives is the regular valuation of the portfolio.  We were interested in 
comparing how often firms value their derivatives portfolio.  Because of the stricter external disclosure 
requirements in the US, we expect a higher frequency of re-valuation activity in the US than in the 
Netherlands.  Most US firms report a monthly (28%) or quarterly (31%) re-valuation frequency.  The 
same holds for Dutch firms, but with slightly lower percentages,  25% and 15% respectively.  More 
remarkable is that 22% of the US firms and 44% of the Dutch firms re-value their derivatives portfolio 
only when needed or have no set schedule for re-valuation.     
A final control issue is the measurement and evaluation of the effects of the risk management program.  
In order for firms to determine whether their risk management program has been effective, it must be 
evaluated in some meaningful way.  Table 13 compares the responses of firms when asked to indicate the 
basic approach they use evaluate the success of their currency risk management program.     
[Insert Table13 here] 
 
Interestingly, while financial theory suggests the goal of financial hedging should be to reduce the 
volatility of cash flows,  Table 13 indicates that only 42% of US firms and 23% of Dutch firms indicate 
using this as a benchmark for evaluating their risk management function.  Instead, 37% of Dutch firms 
and 26% of US firms indicate they use an absolute profit or loss approach to evaluating the risk 
management function.   A simple profit or loss approach to the derivative activities was often at the root 
of many of the US corporate derivatives train wrecks in the mid 1990s (e.g., Proctor and Gamble, Gibson 
Greeting cards, Mead, the US trading arm of Metallgesellschaft).  
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VII.  Conclusions 
This paper examines the impact of institutional differences between the US and the Netherlands on the 
financial risk management practices of US and Dutch firms.  Matching the results of a US survey 
(Bodnar, Marston and Hayt (1998)) and an identical Dutch survey creates a truly comparable sample.  
Firms are matched on the basis of sector classification and firm size.  After the matching procedure, 267 
US and 84 Dutch survey respondents remain.  In the second step, we apply weights to the US firms to 
make the sample proportionally look like that of the Dutch firms.  The result of this weighting scheme 
removes the influences of firm size and sector on derivatives usage.  After the weighting, the results 
should more purely reflect institutional differences such as economic and regulatory environment.  
Differences between the US and the Netherlands in four main areas: level of international involvement, 
different financial market structures , the level of focus on shareholder value creation, and the different 
external disclosure requirements, lead us to expect distinct differences in derivatives usage and risk 
management practices.  While differences do exist, except in a few cases, they are not overwhelming.  
This suggests that the primary reasons behind derivatives use are broad economic phenomena rather than 
institutional differences.  However, many of the differences in responses do seem consistent with 
institutional differences between the two countries. First, we find that Dutch firms (for all industry and 
size classes) hedge more financial risk.  This is consistent with the fact that because of the more open 
economy of the Netherlands, Dutch firms experience far more foreign exchange exposure than US firms.  
Furthermore, we find that US firms are more concerned regarding derivatives usage.  We also find that 
Dutch firms generally use banks for derivatives transactions, while US firms use a broader variety of 
counter-parties for derivatives transactions.  Because of the broader array, US firms require higher 
counter-party ratings.  Additionally, the results show that US firms focus more on accounting earnings 
than Dutch firms and are more willing to incorporate their views on foreign exchange rate movements 
when engaging in derivatives transactions.  This type of behavior can be linked to the fact that US firms 
are shareholder oriented, whereas Dutch firms are stakeholder oriented.  The aforementioned results 
indicate that the institutional differences between the US and the Netherlands have a significant effect on 
the risk management practices and derivatives use of US and Dutch firms.   
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Table 1: Samples of  US and Dutch respondents 
 
 US firms   Dutch firms 
  
Manufac- 
turing 
 
Trade Services Total 
  
Manufac- 
turing 
 
Trade Services Total 
Large 
(% of total) 
73 
(27%) 
9 
(3%) 
17 
(6%) 
99 Large 
(% of total) 
13 
(15%) 
3 
(4%) 
9 
(11%) 
25 
Medium 
(% of total) 
35 
(13%) 
5 
(2%) 
7 
(3%) 
47 Medium 
(% of total) 
8 
(9%) 
6 
(7%) 
9 
(11%) 
23 
Small 
(% of total) 
93 
(35%) 
8 
(3%) 
20 
(8%) 
121 Small 
(% of total) 
23 
(27%) 
10 
(12%) 
3 
(4%) 
36 
 
Total 
 
201 22 44 267 
 
Total 44 19 21 84 
 
The results are matched and unweighted.  
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Table 2: Derivatives usage by size  
 
 US firms   Dutch firms 
  
Yes 
(% of 
num) 
 
No 
(% of 
num) 
Total 
(% of 
total) 
  
Yes 
(% of 
num) 
 
No 
(% of  
num) 
Total 
(% of 
total)  
Large 81 
(82%) 
18  
(18%) 
99 
(37%) 
Large 22 
(88%) 
3 
(12%) 
25 
(30%) 
Medium 22 
(46%) 
26 
(54%) 
48 
(18%) 
Medium 13 
(57%) 
10 
(43%) 
23 
(27%) 
Small 14 
(12%) 
106 
(88%) 
120 
(45%) 
Small 15 
(42%) 
21 
(58%) 
36 
(43%) 
Total 
(% of total) 
117 
(44%) 
150 
(56%) 267 
Total 
(% of total) 
50 
(60%) 
34 
(40%) 
 
84 
 
 
Answers to the question: Does your firm use derivatives (forwards, futures, options or swaps)? Large 
firms have total sales of more than DFL 1.5 billion (circa US$ 800 million), medium firms have total 
sales between DFL 500 million and DFL 1.5 billion (between circa US$ 250 million and circa US$ 800 
million) and small firms have total sales of less than DFL 500 million (circa US$ 250 million).  The 
responses are matched and unweighted. 
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Table 3: Derivatives usage by industry  
 
 US firms  Dutch firms 
 
Yes 
(% of 
num) 
No 
(% of 
num) 
Total 
(% of 
total) 
  
Yes 
(% of 
num) 
 
 
No 
(% of 
num) 
 
Total 
(% of 
total) 
Manufacturing 93 
(46%) 
108 
(54%) 
201 
(75%) 
Manufacturing 29 
(66%) 
15 
(34%) 
44 
(52%) 
Trade 6 
(27%) 
16 
(73%) 
22 
(8%) 
Trade  11 
(58%) 
8 
(42%) 
19 
(23%) 
Services 18 
(41%) 
26 
(59%) 
44 
(17%) 
Services 10 
(48%) 
11 
(52%) 
21 
(25%) 
Total 
(% of total) 
117 
(44%) 
150 
(56%) 
267 Total 
(% of total) 
50 
(60%) 
34 
(40%) 
84 
 
Answers to the question: What is the main activity of your firm? The responses are matched and 
unweighted.
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Table 4: Type of financial risk hedged 
 
 Currency risk Interest rate risk Commodity risk 
US firms 79% 73% 44% 
Dutch firms 96% 81% 20% 
 
Answers to the question: Which of the following statements best describes your organization’s approach 
to the use of derivatives to manage each of the following forms of risk? Only for those respondents who 
answered negative on the choice: exposure not managed with derivatives.  The responses are matched and 
weighted for hedgers. 
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Table 5: What do firms try to manage with hedging  
 
 most second most least not at all important/ 
 important important important not a consideration 
US firms     
Volatility in accounting earnings 44% 37% 13% 7% 
Volatility in cash flows 50% 29% 16% 4% 
Balance sheet accounts or ratios 1% 11% 65% 23% 
Dutch firms     
Volatility in accounting earnings 33% 31% 13% 23% 
Volatility in cash flows 60% 21% 10% 10% 
Balance sheet accounts or ratios 8% 26% 45% 21% 
 
Answers to the question: If you use derivatives to hedge, please indicate what the firm is trying to manage 
with the hedge.  The responses are unmatched and unweighted.  
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Table 6: Types of derivatives used 
 
Currency risk 
 US firms Dutch firms 
OTC forwards  56% 77% 
Futures 12% 0% 
Exchange-traded options  1% 0% 
Swaps 8% 2% 
OTC options 16% 12% 
Structured derivatives  6% 7% 
Hybrid debt 2% 2% 
Interest rate risk 
 US firms Dutch firms 
OTC forwards  4% 28% 
Futures 4% 3% 
Swaps 78% 52% 
OTC options 3% 17% 
Exchange-traded options  0% 0% 
Structured derivatives  7% 0% 
Hybrid debt 5% 0% 
Commodity risk 
 US firms Dutch firms 
OTC forwards  15% 0% 
Futures 40% 6% 
Swaps 27% 18% 
OTC options 7% 35% 
Exchange-traded options  7% 12% 
Structured derivatives  4% 24% 
Hybrid debt 0% 6% 
 
This question was part of the Dutch survey but not part of the 1998 US survey.  The US answers to this 
question come from the 1995 Wharton survey (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1996)).   The question was 
“For each source of exposure that you manage, rank the seven types of derivatives by order of importance 
in your firm’s management of that exposure.”  The table displays the percentage of firms ranking each 
item as the most important.    Because the US answers come from a different response sample (from the 
same overall sample) the responses are unmatched and unweighted. 
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Table 7: Foreign currency operating costs and revenues 
 
Foreign currency operating revenues hedgers: US firms 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 40% 50+% 
16% 10% 19% 4% 7% 5% 11% 7% 21% 
Foreign currency operating costs hedgers: US firms  
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 40% 50+% 
12% 21% 16% 7% 7% 6% 13% 4% 14% 
Foreign currency operating revenues hedgers: Dutch firms 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 40% 50+% 
0% 0% 23% 4% 23% 8% 8% 19% 15% 
Foreign currency operating costs hedgers: Dutch firms 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 40% 50+% 
0% 0% 25% 7% 25% 18% 0% 14% 11% 
 
Answer to the question: What percentage of your consolidated operating revenues and costs is in foreign 
currencies (currencies other than the one used for reporting purposes)? The responses are matched and 
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Table 8: Benchmark for currency hedgers  
 
 US firms Dutch firms 
Our firm does not use a benchmark 43% 60% 
Forward rates available at the beginning of the period 21% 19% 
Spot rates at the beginning of the period 20% 8% 
Baseline percent hedged strategy (i.e.  X% hedged) 9% 4% 
Other benchmark (give a brief explanation) 7% 8% 
 
Answer to the question: Which benchmark does your firm use for evaluating foreign currency risk 
management over the budget/planning period? The responses are matched and weighted for currency 
hedgers.  
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Table 9: Hedging horizon 
 
US firms Contractual 
commitments 
Anticipated 
transactions 
Economic/ 
competitive  
exposure 
Foreign 
repatriations 
 
Translation 
of foreign 
accounts 
Hedge shorter than the maturity of the 
exposure 
5% 15% 31% 19% 19% 
Hedge the maturity of the exposure 88% 78% 50% 74% 52% 
Hedge longer than the maturity of the 
exposure 
5% 3% 0% 0% 3% 
Hedge to the end of the budget/fiscal 
year 
2% 4% 19% 7% 26% 
Dutch firms Contractual 
commitments 
Anticipated 
transactions 
Economic/ 
competitive  
exposure 
Foreign 
repatriations 
 
Translation 
of foreign 
accounts 
Hedge shorter than the maturity of the 
exposure 
3% 13% 31% 19% 30% 
Hedge the maturity of the exposure 94% 73% 38% 71% 30% 
Hedge longer than the maturity of the 
exposure 
3% 10% 15% 0% 0% 
Hedge to the end of the budget/fiscal 
year 
0% 3% 15% 10% 40% 
 
Answer to the question: For each of the following exposures, which best describes your typical hedging 
horizon? The responses are matched and weighted for currency hedgers.   
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Table 10: Market view on exchange rates 
 
US firms never sometimes frequently 
Alter the timing of hedges 51% 41% 8% 
Alter the size of hedges 50% 41% 9% 
Actively take positions in currency derivatives 63% 33% 4% 
Dutch firms never sometimes frequently 
Alter the timing of hedges 50% 45% 5% 
Alter the size of hedges 57% 36% 7% 
Actively take positions in currency derivatives 77% 18% 5% 
 
Answer to the question: How often does your market view of exchange rates cause you to… The 
responses are matched and weighted for currency hedgers.   
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Table 11: Approach to risk management activities 
 
US firms Currency 
risk 
Interest 
risk 
Commodity 
risk 
Exposure not managed with derivatives 22% 28% 62% 
Risk management activities primarily centralized 65% 69% 28% 
Risk management decisions primarily decentralized 
with centralized coordination 9% 2% 5% 
Risk management activities primarily decentralized 3% 1% 4% 
Dutch firms 
Currency 
risk 
Interest 
risk 
Commodity 
risk 
Exposure not managed with derivatives 4% 19% 80% 
Risk management activities primarily centralized 75% 81% 12% 
Risk management decisions primarily decentralized 
with centralized coordination 
 
17% 
 
0% 
 
4% 
Risk management activities primarily decentralized 4% 0% 4% 
 
Answers to the question: Which of the following statements best describes your organization’s approach 
to the use of derivatives to manage each of the following forms of risk? The responses are matched and 
weighted for hedgers. 
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Table 12: Counter-party rating 
 
 Maturities 12 months 
or less 
Maturities more than 
12 months  
 US firms Dutch firms  US firms Dutch firms 
AAA 7% 6% 8% 11% 
AA 18% 20% 27% 33% 
A 47% 33% 43% 17% 
BBB 4% 2% 1% 0% 
Less than BBB 0% 0% 0% 0% 
No set policy/don't know 24% 39% 21% 39% 
 
Answers to the question: What is the lowest counter-party rating with which you will enter a 
derivatives transaction? The responses are matched and weighted for hedgers. 
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Table 13: Evaluation of the risk management function 
 
 US firms Dutch firms 
Reduced volatility relative to a benchmark 42% 23% 
Increased profit relative to a benchmark 16% 20% 
Absolute profit/loss 26% 37% 
Risk adjusted performance  16% 20% 
 
Answer to the question: How do you evaluate the risk management function? The responses are matched 
and weighted for hedgers. 
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Figure 1: Concerns regarding derivatives 
 
Answer to the question: Indicate your degree of concern about the following issues with respect to 
derivatives.  The responses are matched and weighted for hedgers. 
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Figure 2: Reasons for not using derivatives 
 
Answers to the question: Please indicate the three most important factors in your decision not to use 
derivatives.  The responses are matched and weighted for non-hedgers. 
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Figure 3: Reasons for currency derivatives transactions  
 
Answers to the question: How often does your firm transact in the currency derivatives markets to hedge 
the currency exposures mentioned below? The responses are matched and weighted for currency hedgers. 
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Figure 4: Reporting of derivatives activity 
 
Answers to the question: How frequently is derivatives activity reported to the Board of Directors? The  
responses are matched and weighted for hedgers. 
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